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 Abstract  To clarify the relationship or non-relation between the Minimalist genre of the 
drone and musical meaning, three drone-related works by Joan La Barbara, Eleh and Keiji Haino 
are discussed with respect to their relative proximity to, or distance from, language and/or 
speech.  Each piece of music is also considered in terms of the subject who listens, leading to 
some speculative thoughts on the uses made of the drone and its remarkable persistence and 
diversity. 
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The entry for ‘drone’ in the Continuum Encyclopedia of Popular Music of the World defines it in the 
following way:  
one or more sustained notes of identical pitch that, usually, accompany a melodic line 
often performed in a higher register.  The note(s) can be sounded continuously (a 
‘continual drone’) or be repeated at short intervals (a ‘rhythmic drone’).  Drones act as a 
tonal reference point and background for the changing pitch of other strands in the 
music. (Tagg 2003: 532) 
The drone in these uninterrupted or rhythmically variable formats, and with these functions, has 
been a staple in musical performance across the world for a long time: in the Indian raga, the 
Scottish bagpipes, in polyphonic choral works, and so on. In late 1950s New York, however, 
drones started being produced by composers and musicians without melodic adornment as 
works in their own right and not as the tonic spine of a more elaborate composition. 
The composer, La Monte Young, is known to be a pioneer in this regard with his Trio for 
Strings (1958) and a work written two years later as part of a series: Composition 1960 #7 (July).  
The score of the latter in its entirety is the perfect fifth B F# interval, notated on a staff, plus the 
words ‘to be held for a long time.’  The duration of a performance of this score is entirely 
dependent upon the endurance of the performer or performers; there is no need to stop playing 
just because the audience has left the building or because they refuse to do so: the verbal 
instruction to maintain the appropriate position in the sounding of a player’s instrument for what 
feels like a prolonged or interminable period can also be interpreted as a poetic addendum to the 
musical notation, concerning the potential relation to the work of a subject present to hear it.  As 
the performers perpetuate the sound, ‘being held’ by it, depending on the taste of the individual 
listener, could involve feeling involuntarily detained by the drone or embraced and supported by 
it; it could involve transitions between those states in either direction.  This essay discusses the 
experience of listening to three drones or, more accurately, three drone-based or drone-related 
works: Joan La Barbara’s Voice Piece: One-Note Internal Resonance Investigation; Floating Frequencies: 
Intuitive Synthesis III -  Phase Two: “Bass Pulse In Open Air” by Eleh; and Keiji Haino’s “Wisdom 
That Will Bless I, Who Live In The Spiral Joy Born At The Utter End Of A Black Prayer.”  And 
in discussing these works, the following questions will be considered: What do these works mean?  
Do these works mean?  If they can mean, in what ways do they bear their meanings?  What are 
they for if they don’t mean?   
How could one begin to speak about a drone?  The semiotician’s approach to musical 
analysis, which thinks of music as a kind of discourse, if it ever reflected upon the drone, would 
consider it as a limit-case which defeats semiotic analysis.  Raymond Monelle’s Linguistics and 
Semiotics in Music declares that “[a] single note has no meaning” (Monelle 1992: 20).  If we assume 
with Monelle, for the sake of argument, that there is such a thing as a ‘single note,’ we can 
comprehend his insistence that this particle must be impervious to analysis and division but 
capable of combining in series with other single notes which will yield meanings: 
 
If a single note (the ‘museme’, a note in all its parameters of pitch, value, dynamics and 
so on) is the atomic unit of music, then the smallest meaningful unit or ‘unit of music-
logical form’, the musical morpheme, must consist of at least three notes because two are 
needed to generate logical relations, and two terms – two sets of relations – are necessary 
for any proposition. (76) 
This formula for generating the most minute but meaningful musical entity is confirmed at the 
receiving end: “the relations that lead to analysis only begin when two or more notes are 
combined; the minimal analytical unit comprises at least two notes, usually more” (89).  Likewise, 
Kofi Agawu’s Music as Discourse: Semiotic Adventures in Romantic Music argues that one sound has to 
stop happening and another begin (and so on, in arranged sequence) for a ‘musical discourse’ to 
be established: 
Just as linguists distinguish levels of analysis, taking the sentence as the unit for linguistic 
analysis, and a succession of sentences as the domain for discourse analysis, so we can 
think about music in terms of a succession of “sentences,” themselves accretions of 
those smaller meaningful utterances we called events.  Musical discourse, in this sense, 
embraces the larger hierarchical level that encompasses these sentences. (Agawu 2000: 7) 
Agawu’s terms here might appear to indicate that the ‘single note’ could constitute one of “those 
smaller meaningful utterances we [call] events” but his own list of what qualifies as an event runs 
to “an idea, a motive, a progression, or more neutrally, a building block, phrase, segment, or 
unit” none of which exist in isolation but “are generally assumed to unfold in orderly fashion” 
(7).  However ‘meaningful’ the event might be in isolation, therefore, it is only ever “a set of 
events which succeed and relate to each other” which are capable of “making a meaningful 
impression on the listener” (7).  The assumption in both arguments is that each single note in a 
sequence will sound momentarily, from a plucked or bowed string or a depressed key, but what 
if the single note is extended and the sounding of the extended single note is the entirety of the 
work?  The drone could not be considered the musical analogue of a sentence or even a word.  
The semiotician waiting for a relation or two to be generated in the shift to another and then 
another note (which never come) would have to accept that, for the drone, there is nothing to 
say and nothing to be said.  If the drone in its purest form can be considered one sound 
extending itself without meaningful alteration, without a progression to something else, then it 
seems that the drone cannot function as a musical sign.  What would this mean for the drone?  It 
doesn’t mean that a drone can’t be granted a meaning, but it may just mean that a drone can’t 
create or possess a meaning without a composer/listener applying concepts and connections to it, 
provoked by what is heard, certainly, but also via paratextual information, in the design of record 
sleeves, the wording of titles, the personal history of a fan’s connection to the music.  Drones, 
after all, have routinely been identified with ritual, acts of worship, trance-states, the use of 
hallucinogenic drugs, the stirring of martial or nationalist sentiments, and austere avant garde 
aesthetics.  The role of the subject as donor of meaning to the drone is a topic I will return to 
later in the essay, though only with respect to the act of listening, and with guidance drawn from 
the titles of the tracks but not their wider contexts and other kinds of paratext.   
Joan La Barbara’s collaborations with and influence upon composers such as Cage, 
Feldman, Reich and Glass would be enough to award her a crucial place in the history of 
experimental music and of Minimalism in particular, but I intend to discuss the score and 
performance of her own first composition, Voice Piece: One Note Internal Resonance Investigation.  La 
Barbara has spoken of the importance of exercises conducted with jazz musicians in the early 
1970s, where she tried to imitate their instruments as they played “long tones on single pitches,” 
for renewing the ways she used her voice and the ways she thought about the role of voice in 
performance (La Barbara 2002: 36).  Voice Piece: One Note Internal Resonance Investigation was 
premiered at St. Mark’s Church, New York, in December 1974 and its character attests to the 
formative influence of the training she had undertaken with the jazz players.  A performance of 
the score appears as the second track on her first album, Voice Is the Original Instrument, a 
recording La Barbara has described as “a statement of purpose and a manifesto” involving the 
invention of various means to “rediscover the basic function of the voice as the first means of 
expression as well as to release untapped sonic material” (La Barbara 2003: n.p.). 
 Voice Piece accomplishes this task by directing performers to generate one note of their 
own choosing, which La Barbara’s score specifies should be “clear, clean and specific,” from a 
sequence of separate sites in the singer’s body (her head and throat) (La Barbara in Ripley 2016: 
47).  Factors such as the length of each breath, and the consequent variation in efforts to 
maintain the single note; directions to ease the tension in the throat “and allow tones to 
fluctuate” or to sustain the tension when especially pleasing sounds are being made; the switch 
between distinct locations for the sound created, each of these contribute to the disclosing of 
layers of timbral texture or noise inside the primary signal (La Barbara in Ripley 2016: 56).  
  
Before I begin to discuss the work in more detail, it is worth stating upfront that there is 
no indication La Barbara’s Voice Piece was intended to be a drone, even if it can be said to 
conform in a loose sense to the definition given of the rhythmic drone in the quotation with 
which this essay began.  Presumably, each iteration of a rhythmic drone would be coordinated in 
an arrangement of measured sounds and silences where the desired duration of each sound and 
each silence is determined by aesthetic preferences.  Strictly speaking, then, Voice Piece cannot be 
a rhythmic drone because its internal structure is decided by other factors I will go on to discuss 
in a moment.  I interpret Voice Piece instead as a work which, perhaps inadvertently, both 
competes with and exposes the drone in its role as one newly prominent genre in the Minimalist 
sound repertoire of the time, a genre which does not originate, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau thought 
music must, “from the stress and rhythm of natural speech” but in an indifference to those 
rhythms (Monelle 1992: 3).   
 In Voice Piece, as it appears on Voice Is the Original Instrument, a first phoneme, a wo- sound, 
is sustained and permitted to resonate while refusing or neglecting to become speech or song.  
The full title of the composition is an appropriate name for a quasi-scientific inquiry into the 
nature of the voice, its tones and timbres.  It can also be read as referring to a detached portion 
of an utterance, one particular element plucked from the panoply of vocal options, to be 
considered separately for the purposes of a meticulous and methodical analysis of the qualities of 
the single note subjected to a range of fluctuations in La Barbara’s vocal apparatus as it aims to 
prolong and vary the sound.  Internal resonance tells us that the sound is influenced or 
determined by the location from which it emerges in La Barbara’s mouth and throat cavities but, 
just as pertinently, that the investigation pertains to the inside of the one-note, its intrinsic 
features.  Her concentrated focus on the single tone nonetheless develops into what can be heard 
as a valiant effort to produce a drone without the means to keep it going beyond the length of a 
single breath.   
 
 Samara Ripley has written the most useful and comprehensive description and analysis of 
La Barbara’s early work and her interpretation of Voice Piece employs the concepts of echos (pure, 
meaningless sound), topos (the place from which a sound emerges) and logos (discursive 
significance) to account for what she sees as an oscillation in its performance between an 
originary non-semantic music and passages where the sounds “become meaningful” (Ripley 
2016: 47).  What Ripley has called La Barbara’s “resonance placements” imbricate echos with topos 
and, she argues, at the point where listeners find themselves able to “at times connect the sounds 
with specific spots within La Barbara’s head and throat…the nature of the sounds as purely echos, 
or non-semantic, begins to change” (50).  The “wordless-sounds” we hear acquire “signifying 
power” because, we are told, “they are representative of La Barbara’s body” (50).  If, however, 
we should ask Ripley what the sounds we hear mean, what they signify in the moments we 
identify (or think we identify) where they start in a performer’s physique, we may be 
disappointed to learn that this in fact is all they mean: that they come from this location.  This is 
only interesting because La Barbara’s sound-world is, Ripley asserts, strange enough to make this 
fact easy to forget as you listen: “the unusual nature of her vocalizations creates a separation of 
sound from source (body) in which the latter does not appear to match the former” (58).  Ripley 
overstates the extent to which La Barbara’s voice sounds estranged from the places where it 
begins when she identifies moments in Voice Piece when the sounds made are, she says, “far too 
low for a female voice” or which “bear notable resemblance to non-human noises, such as the 
rumbling of a machine.” (51) Meaning is supposed to kick in when an accurate identification of 
the sound-source as La Barbara’s living, female body becomes possible, but this idea is untenable 
since a mistaken verdict (the sound I hear is being made by a man or by a machine) is arrived at 
by use of the same “signifying power” as a correct diagnosis.  The aspects of Voice Piece to which 
Ripley draws attention here are met during a continuous feat of vocalising we may marvel at for 
the performer’s stamina and for the anomalous sounds we now and again hear, but I don’t 
believe we experience the encounter either as a securing of meaning or as its loss, depending on 
whether or not we shift from a wrong identification to a correct one, or vice versa, if that is in 
fact what we do as we listen.       
 
 Ripley’s report on the performance is, on the whole, precise and valuable, but her 
evaluation of the process of becoming-meaningful is underwhelming because the semantic 
payoff is minimal.  A similar problem exists in some music writing informed by the philosophy 
of Gilles Deleuze, where a particular position taken on the subject leads to a hyperbolic and inert 
account of the consequences of an experience of sound.  Paul C. Jasen, responding to a 
challenge he says was issued by Deleuze, insists that “experience” should not be considered as 
something undergone by a subject so much as the subject is a “trajectory” composed of 
momentary orders of “localized patterning” in a field whose “totality is chaotic” (Jasen 2016: 22-
3). The concept of the world as fluctuating experiential field giving rise to new subjects is 
prevalent also in writing on music by Claire Colebrook who, in an essay co-authored with David 
Bennett, argues that  
 
[a]ccording to this [Deleuzian] perspective, music would not constitute a referential 
system: we would read or hear music not as it relates to a system of signs always already 
given in advance but, rather, according to its capacity to transform bodies, organs and 
territories. (Colebrook and Bennett 2009: 68) 
 
The promise of radical metamorphoses swiftly winds down to drastically modest, imprecise and 
occasionally banal reports on the professed novelty of a work based on its divergence from a 
previous model: “[David Chesworth’s Badlands Suite] repeats chords and motifs [“composed by 
Carl Orff”] and draws out variation and difference” (Colebrook and Bennett, 74).  Or, the use of 
the didgeridoo in Peter Sculthorpe’s Earth Cry “presents a new matter of sound that would then 
allow us to hear the orchestra, not as one more composed piece in a linear history of music, but 
as one modality of sound among others” (77).  When the advantage of a Deleuzian approach is 
advertised, often by exaggerated claims, the ontological state it promotes can seem starved and 
ill-defined: “There is neither a subject nor a world that would speak, cry or perceive; instead, 
there are encounters among elements that produce discernible points” (78).  One reason for 
these bathetic outcomes is that the style Jasen and Colebrook borrow from Deleuze does not 
amount to an analysis of the relation between a subject and a musical work.  Instead, we are 
given a fanciful re-description of an event, which effaces the presence and agency of a subject so 
it can conjure a ‘new’ subject back as the creation of the encounter it has undergone.  Jasen cites 
a passage by Brian Massumi to describe Jasen’s own approach to the meeting of a body and 
music: “It is a relay between the corporeal and incorporeal dimensions.  This is not yet a subject.  
But it may well be the conditions of emergence of a subject: an incipient subjectivity” (Massumi 
in Jasen, 24).  A more plausible and powerfully challenging method of defining and eradicating the 
subject in its relation to art is to be found in an essay by Keston Sutherland on the contrasting 
attitudes to subjectivity in the philosophy of Hegel and the work of the poet, J.H. Prynne.  
Sutherland demonstrates with formidable scholarship and relentless force that for Prynne the 
subject as “an originating sponsor or process of individual consciousness” is “what must be let 
go” (Sutherland 2015: 130).  The entire context for this particular belief cannot be explored here; 
what I want to borrow from Prynne via Sutherland is the undeniable fact that there is a subject, 
and that you are most probably it, and that the immediate and absolute prerogative may be to get 
rid of you-the-subject, not to bring a new one into existence or refurbish an old one until it is 
unrecognisable.  For Prynne, this is part of a complex argument about a shift from poetic 
thinking associated with an individuated subject position to a coherence of poetic thought 
liberated from such associations: 
 
Personal beliefs, memory, emotion, and physiology of personhood are the origins of 
poetic thought, but they are never the substance of thought once it is achieved.  The 
manifestation of poetic thought depends on finding a way to discard these origins from 
language, or to leave them behind as language itself reaches toward the thought 
immanent in its own extremes (Sutherland, 135).  
 
The Deleuzian re-description in Jasen and Colebrook does not consider these four stubborn 
elements mentioned here as constituting the armature of a subject, but they cannot simply be 
wished away in order to be conjured into being later as “discernible points” by the magic of the 
didgeridoo.  Prynne’s position is articulated as part of an argument about an achievement in 
language that takes place through the elimination of the enunciation’s origins in an individual 
subject position.  Music, because it is not as immediately connected to a system of references in 
the way that a chain of  signifiers are, and because it is therefore less identifiable as a series of 
communicating utterances, enables a Deleuzian description of musical experience as  involving 
unlocatable and unmoored experiences and perceptions giving rise to an occasional subject.  The 
overlooking of the presence of the composing or listening subject then deprives us of the 
opportunity and obligation to labour towards the expunging of a figure already too firmly 
installed. 
 
Ripley’s analysis is limited to arguing that La Barbara’s music means something only 
when it points back towards the subject it emerges from, and only ever means this pointing or 
this emergence; the outcomes for Jasen and Colebrook, despite the expectations of innovation 
and subjectivization, are similarly modest.  Jasen admits as much when describing what he really 
thinks happens when someone listens to music: 
 
The implication is not that a total, molar transformation occurs (we do not literally turn 
into a sound wave).  Nor is a becoming-sonic a matter of imitation or metaphor (i.e. 
play-acting or ‘mere’ discourse), and this distinction illustrates the difference between 
mediation and modulation.  Where sound and body interact, we can speak of ‘an 
inhumanity, immediately experienced in the body as such.’  It is a process of 
transduction, the sounding of a mind-body and a taking-on – even non-consciously or 
unwillingly – of certain affects of the impinging force. (Jasen 2016: 24-5) 
 
This sounds less like the irruption of an unprecedented Adamic subject than the mundane 
situation of being affected by what you hear.  Voice Piece is especially significant for La Barbara 
because it accomplishes her transformation from an interpreter and performer into a composer, 
but an analysis of the listener’s experience of the work itself requires an approach which is 
attentive to the nature of the restrictions on Voice Piece’s bearing of meanings, in terms of the 
distance from language of its sounds.   
 
In a rendition of Voice Piece, air is impelled through the vocal folds with a more constant 
or consistent effort than the modulated forces at work in conventional singing or everyday 
speech.  This fact constitutes the performance as a careful and focussed activity which almost 
entirely deprives itself of an affective component, by volume control and the adoption of a tone 
selected primarily on the basis that it is physiologically conducive to the maintenance of the 
sound.  This effort to sustain the neutrality of the one-note produces another obstacle in the way 
of a semiotic analysis of the drone.  Agawu argues that  
 
a musical work is conceived as a sequence of events [which]  are generally assumed to 
unfold in orderly fashion.  To understand a Beethoven sonata or a Liszt tone poem as 
discourse, therefore, is to understand it as constituted by a set of events which succeed 
and relate to each other, the whole making a meaningful impression on the listener. 
(Agawu 2000: 7) 
 
None of the drone-related works we will look at in this essay are the same sound unchanging 
from beginning to end and I would go as far as to say that each of them could be considered, in 
different ways, to have been “conceived as a sequence” – Voice Piece, as we know, is a sequence 
of oral variations on one note which follow each other in accordance with the systematic 
exploration of “resonance placements” as determined in La Barbara’s score – but it might be 
best to consider the structure of these works as involving succession and relation in terms of 
something we could call extension without meaningful alteration.  La Barbara’s vocal music has 
nothing much to do with the notion of words set to music where the music corroborates a sense 
already established in words which pre-existed it.  Voice Piece is produced in the refusal or 
prolonged reluctance of a phoneme to become a word and, therefore, to take on a definition.  
Topological resonance effects and the shift into multiphonics in the final third of Voice Piece are 
not modifications in an utterance which is trying to persuade a listener of something.   If there 
can be said to be a law of the drone then it appears to promote the generation of the same, or 
the very similar, with the one-note or interval or chord or sound as both minimal and maximal 
unit.  From the perspective of the semiotician, the refusal to countenance extending to two or 
three notes in a staged succession suggests that the drone says nothing or attempts to say the 
least that can be said.  If the drone is music and music is discourse then the drone is the 
arrestation or abortion of discursivity at its hypothetical inaugural point, at the moment where 
one initial sound is produced but before something or anything else happens, and it is also the 
effort to remain at that limit.  One consequence is that, contra Ripley, the lapses in sound when 
La Barbara breathes in again are as good an index of meaning than anything in the sounds 
themselves. 
 
 With the gradual extension of the phoneme into the drone during the longer passages of 
Voice Piece, we start to experience our anticipation of the unavoidable failure of breath in La 
Barbara, and listen to her attempt to delay the arrival of its end. This kind of sustained phonation 
depends upon the vocalist’s facility in conserving a stable tautness in the flexible tissues of the 
vocal mechanism and diaphragm, while keeping the vocal folds in a condition where they are still 
supple and slack enough to move rapidly.  The sounds produced tend to begin with strong 
vibrations, amplified by the throat, which decompose into a more quiet voice marked by 
different levels of fry, as less energy gets expended so that the investigation can be prolonged.  
When the sound is cut and we lapse into silence, it tends not to be when La Barbara feels herself 
wavering from the one note, since the investigation is concerned in part with precisely the forces 
which cause this to happen and their outcomes.  The particular note, the wo- sound, was chosen 
because it is relatively easy to manage its prolongation compared to other sounds. If it was 
uttered as the first moment of an act of verbal communication what we would be waiting for is 
the articulation of a consonant.  The movement from one vowel to another can be managed by 
recalibrating the tone of a resonance, and a consonant acts as the cut which forms word 
boundaries; in many cases the consonant might stop the breath momentarily.  Some consonant 
sounds are described by phoneticians as ‘stops,’ since they briefly discontinue other kinds of 
consonant or vowel sound that could hypothetically have been sustained, and make a pause 
before progress to the next sound, usually by closing up an aperture, the rim of the mouth or the 
glottis.    
P is an unvoiced labial stop.  F is a labiodental, spirant sound.  One can be held and 
sustained to the end of the breath, and one cannot.  A word-initial sound like BR is, like F, 
sustainable.  A sound made from a mouthful of air can only constitute a drone if certain rules of 
selection or operation are followed: the sound you start with enables and affects the 
development or extension of the sound.  La Barbara’s performance stops briefly at the end of 
each breath and, before that, the sound of her voice labouring, the exertion of different kinds 
and degrees of force, makes something else ring out in the note, something which is both more 
and less than the letter or syllable: the internal fissures in the note, the sound of friction, the 
resistance her body puts up to the sounding of its own voice.  The voice is compromised by the 
incorporation which makes it possible, and the compromise involves further incorporations, of 
spacing, texture and silence in the sounds. The silence we can hear at the end of each part of 
Voice Piece is a constituent of the sound which precedes it since within each note differentials are 
revealed by the effort of extension which generates the one-note as a drone.  Efforts have been 
made by some composers and musicians related to Minimalist practice to generate a drone by 
eradicating the limitations imposed by the human body, limitations such as the need to breathe, 
or the problems generating a drawn-out note on the viola when we are hampered and prevented 
by the shape, position, and size of the instrument, the length of the human arm and its jointed 
articulation.  Electronic processing makes it possible to go on and on breathlessly, and to 
eliminate the micropause at the end of a player’s gesture which is still discernible in 
performances of Trio for Strings by La Monte Young.  Young, according to Keith Potter, had 
requested “the production of a smooth, steady bow stroke while also minimizing the audibility of 
the change of bow direction so that the long sustained tones sound as uninterrupted as possible” 
(Potter 2000: 35).  Along the same lines, Branden W. Joseph mentions the use of aerophones in 
the execution of Young’s Vision “to sustain tones of any duration that, by chance, had been 
determined to exceed what a brass or woodwind player could normally achieve without drawing 
breath” (Joseph 2011: 86).   Potter sums up this tendency when he remarks that “Minimalism, 
with its contrast-free continuity of drones, repetitions, processes and so on, tends not to 
breathe” (Potter 2013: 7).  Holding and being held by the one-note, at the point before it is 
modified to become a unit in an utterance which has a meaning or meanings, donates to the one-
note an array of attenuated implications which must include a measure of pathos from the 
disclosure of a mortal human subject most obvious in the gaps between sounds as the breath 
fails.  If La Monte Young’s drones would repress breaks and transitions, La Barbara’s inhalations 
constitute an accidental act of interference in the generation of a drone by a body and a subject.  
The electronic drone, on the other hand, is not propelled or confined by human musculature, its 
extension is not driven by the continuous effort of a body.  When we listen to a track such as 
Eleh’s “Bass Pulse in Open Air,” the disembodied origin of the sounds we hear, and not just 
those sounds ‘themselves,’ generates a local sensation of buoyancy in the experience of the 
pulsations, and a more general pleasure in the fluctuations in repetition of the pulses.  We listen 
to the pulses move as a metamorphosing sound surface and may even have a sense of 
participating in their motion as we are carried along by it.  The extended title of the track tells us 
that the frequencies we hear float, but it also cannot help but direct our listening and thinking 
from the music back to the conveyance of blood through the arteries by the contractions of the 
heart, the idea of the pulse used as a temporal measure to indicate the vitality of the body, even 
as the rest of the title seems to propose that the low and deep and rounded frequencies were 
recorded or (more likely) are meant to be heard across a clear, outside space, set up to allow the 
free passage of the sounds extending and expanding outwards ad infinitum.      
Eleh insists upon their music being played at very high volume and, if possible, 
simultaneously from different directions, and this insistence contributes to extending the 
production of sound beyond the idea of its origin in a human body, since the sound is no longer 
coming from one identifiable, local vantage point but a surroundsound field where the 
demarcation between inside and outside is elided.  When the conditions are right, the music is 
experienced as in you going outwards as if from you, and in part that is where it is coming from, 
since what we hear includes combination tones and location effects, sounds in us and not in the 
drone, while the drone/pulsations are also coming at us all the time, in us and still coming at us 
from an outside, from everywhere.  The deliberate inducing of combination tones and location 
effects presupposes a subject in which they can be induced, since we can only hear what is not 
present if we are.      
The separate and very different practices of La Barbara and Eleh are comparable in their 
affirmations and negations of the subject as sounds and silences are exchanged and extended 
across spaces and durations.  La Barbara and Eleh both affirm the presence of the subject as 
sound source and target but negate it in dispensing with the subject as individuated memory-
bucket and speaking being.  
 
The final drone-related work I would like to consider is perhaps the closest of the three 
to what might be considered a pure drone, at least for most of its extent:  Keiji Haino’s “Wisdom 
that will bless I, who live in the spiral joy born at the utter end of a black prayer.”  The track lasts 
for just over sixty seven minutes and there is no substantial material change in the sound of the 
track, a drone made from several tone oscillators generating layered sine waveforms which seem 
to be just out of sync with each other, until around forty minutes in, where you can hear a very 
gentle, momentary intervention by Haino’s percussion and vocals.  The title of the work may 
also be the lyrics Haino sings in falsetto, after an introductory passage where in a kind of soft 
wordless rumbling he attempts to harmonise with the drone.   
Compared to La Barbara’s Voice Piece or the ominous throbs in “Bass Pulse in Open Air,” 
there are no gaps to be heard in the overlaid drones of “Wisdom that will bless I…”  The drone 
in every instance may just be a gap or void in its own right since the semiotician would argue that 
it cannot bear a meaning of its own.  Or perhaps we could think, also and on the contrary, that 
the drone is technically replete for exactly the same reason, since it has not opened up to the 
difference which constitutes a system of signs?  If both of these interpretations are possible, we 
could consider the drone as a genre which calls for the intervention of a subject which would 
always be an opening up to meaning.  When Haino’s voice eventually adds itself to the 
unadulterated sound of the oscillators, in doing so, it makes and marks a place in the track.  The 
intoned words situated with respect to the drone announce or give thanks for the imminent gift 
of wisdom, the ability, in other words, to decide wisely in matters relating to life and conduct, 
and to excel in his chosen field, as the reward for surviving a profound darkness, for persevering 
to the utmost extreme of an experience and emerging intact.  His presence as a principle of 
division or discontinuity suggests that the agent of difference in the drone is always the subject.  
The drone is divided into a before and an after by the subtle intervention of Haino’s light 
percussive sounds and tentative voicings which, as I have said, begin in Haino’s effort to 
harmonise and merge with the drone, to be it and to learn from it and to depart from it in the 
experience of a “spiral joy.”  The lyrics are clearly not ‘part of’ the drone; it is more precise to say 
that they accompany it briefly, they exist around it and might be addressed to it, but they do not 
enjoy the usual ‘fit’ between music and lyrics where the music’s job is to support and confirm the 
verbal content.  Haino’s words nevertheless can function as a key to the listener’s emotive 
response, should there be one, since they are themselves a response to the drone, coming from a 
listener.    
  
As subjects of the drone, Young, La Barbara, Eleh, Haino, you and me, are constituted as 
different kinds of fissure in the drone, in the form of La Barbara’s labour on the inside of the 
one-note, as it follows the inevitable trajectory of our common breath; in Eleh’s deviation effects 
and the reference back to the bump of the blood in the situation of the body; and the way the 
self-similarity of an extended drone such as Haino’s generates a parallactic outcome where the 
music seems to change with alterations in the focus of the listener, to the extent that it seems 
sometimes the listener can make the music slow down and speed up at will.  
 
In a paper addressed to ICE-Z (the International Conference of Esemplastic Zappology) 
on 16 January 2004 in London, Keston Sutherland produced a commentary on an essay by 
Frances Hannett about popular song from a Freudian perspective, as part of a critique of the 
process whereby pop lyrics “with their saccharine buffet of anaclitic affects” train human beings 
in “the symbols and drives of commodity-love, by which I mean both the love of commodities 
and love itself in commodified form” (Sutherland 2004: n.p.).  Hannett’s essay was published in 
1964 and analyses songs which “deal with a two-person relationship usually based on unreal, 
fanciful, extravagant love” which she divides into four categories: Songs of Possessive 
Dependence; Depressive and Hostile Affects; Songs of Separation Anxiety; and Songs about 
Dreams as Wish Fulfilment (Hannett 1964: 239).  Sutherland argues that the exclusion of “post-
war hit songs” from the samples she selects means her work cannot provide what he aims to: the 
diagnosis of popular music as “possibly the most powerful machinery discovered by capitalism 
to effect” a transition from “real love fresh from the bubbling libido…into commodity love” 
(n.p.).  But Sutherland is not content with just this task since he ends his paper with three pages 
of lively commentary discussing the idiosyncratic narcissistic gratification we get from fantasising 
that the songs we listen to are ours, composed from “our own mental processes,” and 
speculating about the question of what “an irrecuperable art [might] look or sound like” (n.p.). 
 
 Sutherland insists that for an irrecuperable art 
 
[o]ne of the first conditions is that it should totally and violently frustrate the impulse of 
its consumer to fantasise that it is his own production.  How can art be so violent that it 
resists this kind of individualistic recuperation?  At a very basic level, it needs to have 
within it somewhere or other an unadulterated FUCK YOU in the form of some ethical 
or political or sexual exhibition that the one-man test audience could never imagine to be 
his own production, because its confrontation against him is too powerful and total to be 
subsumed under the product-heading of his own immediate cognition.  That is, the work 
of art must have something in it, some moment, that is not capable of being 
subordinated to the free play of abstract interpretive fantasy that is then declared to be 
the work of art itself.  It needs to get a stranglehold on the imagination of its audience 
until they are made to gasp out in panic for some real air, rather than the steady drift of 
ether through the consumption snorkel. It needs at some level to be something that we 
can’t agree with or don’t want, even if later, with the benefit of dialectical reflection, we 
decide that we agree with it on account of its disagreeableness and want it on account of 
its unwantableness.  In fact, irrecuperable art is conceivable as a source of pleasure only 
with this dialectic up and running.  It is a condition of our enjoying the irrecuperable art 
work that what we most sweetly enjoy is how it offends and needles against the 
institution of enjoyment itself as the latter exists in and for capitalist culture. (n.p.) 
 
Since the paper is a contribution to a conference on the music of Frank Zappa, we should not be 
surprised to find that the one example Sutherland furnishes as an example of irrecuperability is 
The Mothers of Invention’s We’re Only In It For The Money, an essentially satirical work which 
seems all too readily available for the kind of appropriation by a consumer that he would wish to 
avoid.  Is it possible that the drone might satisfy the given criteria more completely?  It is an easy 
task to imagine a fan gratified by enjoying not enjoying something if they believe they are 
participating in an act of political or sexual dissidence, as the vacillations around the dialectic at 
the end of the quotation from Sutherland admit.  I want to end this essay by speculating briefly 
on the topic of how far the drone-related musics we have looked at so far might go, given their 
reticence before language and speech and the subject, in satisfying the requirements of 
Sutherland’s strictures on irrecuperability.   
 
In Hannett’s original study, the lure for the listener’s unconscious is the articulation of 
“infantile attitudes” as the manifest content in “the popular lyric” (Hannett, 254).  The musical 
accompaniment to the lyric presumably does no more than help embed this lyric by melodic 
reinforcement and the adoption of these infantile attitudes help to facilitate the mistaken idea 
that songs for listeners are “essentially their own creations” (Sutherland, n.p.).  Our drones, 
however, are instrumental, for the most part.  In Voice Piece, although only a voice is heard, it is 
used as an instrument with, as we have seen, an absolutely minimal or minimised reference to 
speech or language.  Haino’s drone, the only track with words, could nevertheless be considered 
the most instrumental of the set, due to the utter negation of rhythm in the sound of the 
oscillators, which counts as an absence of any reference to prosodies which originate in the body 
as oral (La Barbara) or as pulse-based through capillary action (Eleh).  None of the drones 
considered here are communicative by reference to speech in the mode of the popular song and 
in comparison our experience of the drone is defined by our inability to interpret a linguistic 
supposition.  Is this enough to thwart the “animistic thinking” which Sutherland claims is 
enabled by a culture industry promoting narcissism as the apotheosis of the commodification of 
love?  It is clearly not the sublime and “unadulterated FUCK YOU” which violates the 
imagination of the listener-consumer, but the drone’s impressive indifference to the presence of 
a listener might be more appropriate in the service of Sutherland’s aims.  The enjoyment of 
confrontation in a hostile encounter between song and audience might just be bracing and 
mutually reinforcing, an acknowledgement confirming each party in their place.  On the other 
hand, only enunciating the labio-dental, spirant sound at the beginning of FUCK, for an hour, 
say, whether punctuated by stops or artificially sustained, offers little or no expressive content to 
an interpreter and its Minimalist performance of breathlessness might also make an audience, in 
Sutherland’s words, “gasp out in panic for some real air”  (n.p.). 
 
The drone, unlike popular song and so-called irrecuperable art, makes no demand for a 
response, for reciprocity.  We are unlikely to surprise ourselves by finding that we have been 
singing along in our heads with Voice Piece, “Bass Pulse in Open Air” or “Wisdom That Will 
Bless I….”  On the other hand, it is this very indifference on the part of the drone, the 
impression it gives that it will continue on, oblivious and unmoved with respect to our approval 
or its withholding, our presence or our absence, which elicits from an artist like Haino his 
petition for self-improvement.  The drone is a ruthlessly consistent music which does not listen 
to the listener, does not answer to it, and does not assign it a particular position by conveying a 
meaning of its own in order to shore up the hopeless inconsistency of the human subject.  Its 
indomitable sufficiency is a challenge and lure to any self who would intervene in its immanence 
and introduce difference, desire, dialectics.  These facts, together with the extraordinary tonal, 
durational and instrumental variety available to the genre of the drone, may help explain why the 
drone, beginning as an ur-Minimalist trope, has become so remarkably widespread in 
contemporary musical culture and remains so persistently influential.   
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